The Warpfish Chronicles

"27 years on the planet, and I still haven't figured out what's going on."

True North Strong and Free -- December 17th, 2001

Now, THAT'S a problem. The military is an arm of the government that's meant to enforce that government's policy. However, in this case, (and, in fact, over the past ten years or so), there has been a serious disconnect between what the government wants the military to do, and what the government has funded the military for.

The military is an area that the government feels it can cut freely from -- most Canadians don't have a good feel for it, and most Canadians, frankly, don't care about it. They think peacekeeping missions and soverignity patrols and national defence are things that just happen automatically. Most Canadians have been lulled into a false sense of security because of the presence of the United States next door -- so much so that, we have come to rely on the US for national defence. If the United States were to turn isolationist, or, worse yet, hostile, there wouldn't be anything that we can do about it.

Now, Eggleton would be thrown out of any basic management course for the logic he's using. The logical way of going about this would be to define missions, then define the costs of those missions, and build your military accordingly. If the missions are too expensive, redefine the missions. Don't try to stretch your force to cover missions that they aren't equipped for -- eventually, something will break and people die. They're already in a very dangerous mode because of the age of the helicopters they fly; it's only a matter of time people are killed because of the fact it was too expensive to buy new helicopters to perform missions. If the missions are being flown, if the government decides those missions need to be flown, then buy the hardware and be done with it.

Now, this is not meant as an excuse to waste money. Far from it. This is recognition of the fact that a group is as efficient as practically possible -- any further cuts will not encourage efficiency, but will result in reduced mission performance.

Now, if the Liberal government were willing to redfine missions that a smaller force could do, then, that's no problem either. I may or may not agree, but, at least I could accept that as a point of view. But, the Liberals are forcing a small force to do missions beyond its means; because they don't want to redefine those missions, and they don't want to pay for the force. In the end, the cash that they don't spend will be paid for in blood and lives. Thus, in this case, the Liberal government is acting irresonsibly -- for short term political gain, they're willing to get people killed. Now THAT's unacceptable.

As a side note, what would be my concept of an ideal Canadian Forces? My concept would be based on the following assumptions:

The first would be the recognition that our national soverignity is tied into the status of the United States -- that the Canadian public does not and will probably never have the political will to be independent of the US from a defence perspective. Thus, the Canadian Forces will likely not engage in heavy combat, without allied support, on short notice.

The second -- Canada wishes to continue to have influence and participate in the international scene. In particular, Canada will maintain the same level of Peacekeeping and other duties under UN auspicies.

The third -- while Canada will depend on US forces for support, and for defence against aggresive foreign powers, Canada will want to maintain soverignity patrols, and the ability to intervene in various coalition missions, that involve levels of activity above peacekeeping up to and including war.

Covering the four areas of military force (ground, air, sea, and logistical), we get the following, based on the above assumptions.

Ground forces will consist of light to medium weight infantry and supporting arms. Heavy armour will not be available -- the Canadian Forces will have to rely on anti-armour weapons and medium vehicles for anti-armour protection. Light forces should be configured in rapid-deployment packages, for call for peacekeeping missions. Medium forces will be configured to intervene in coalition missions. As such, medium forces will be more technically advanced, in order to maintain the level of technology required to participate in coalition warfare. In this situation, flexibility is key.

Air forces will be mostly focused on supporting ground forces, as well as maintaining a core air superiority capability. However, it is assumed that in most cases, US forces will have established air superiority over a target; thus, these air superiority capability will be used to fly intercept and soverignity patrols over Canada. This means Air Forces will have to make an investment in attack aircraft, and, if possible, attack helicopters.

Naval forces will be mostly focused on the soveriginty patrol mission; it is assumed that the US Navy will, once again, have established naval sea control. Thus, the Canadian Navy will remain a 'frigate navy', with ships deployed in coalition task forces, or patrolling Canadian waters. However, because of this, Canadian ships must be flexible, and, must be prepared to defend against a wide multitude of threats when operating independently or in small Canadian task groups.

Finally, logistics dicates that Canadian peacekeeping forces be capable of rapid deployment, while Canadian interventionist forces be packaged in a 'standard' manner. Canada is not a power-projection country -- any scenario which requires Canada to intervene, will have Canada intervene in a coaliton. Other countries will be able to maintain rapid power-projection capabilities better than Canada can. Canada should also retain a small special-operations capability, to act in support of objectives that may be more national than international. Such a capability, once surrendered, is not easily replaced.

So, do we have here? The idea is a reasonably small, well-balanced force, well-equipped for peacekeeping and for fighting in coalition operations. (Given its lack of heavy armour, Canada's military would be best suited for defensive operations, or actions in urban/built-up terrain.) It would also be equipped to perform the soverignity patrols that a country must perform, especially one with as long a coastline as Canada has. Finally, its a force built on assumptions in synch with Canada's foreign policy, as opposed to forcing the Forces to perform missions that may be beyond their means.

Mr. Eggleton, that's how you build a military.

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